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Abstract 
If women make different economic decisions than men on average, 
then an increase in women's influence in the political and economic 
spheres of society might change economic outcomes. In this note, we 
focus on the impact of female enfranchisement on fiscal policy 
outcomes. We present a simple median voter model and show that if 
women have different economic preferences than men, then female 
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If women make dierent economic decisions than men on average, then an increase
in women's inuence in the political and economic spheres of society might change
economic outcomes. In this note, we focus on the impact of female enfranchisement
on scal policy outcomes. We present a simple median voter model and show that if
women have dierent economic preferences than men, then female enfranchisement
leads to a change in government budget decits.
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11 Introduction
If women on average make dierent economic decisions than men - be these for social,
cultural or even biological reasons - then an increase in women's inuence in the political
and economic spheres of society might change economic outcomes. This eect - call it the
women eect - has already been shown to be empirically present in the literature on female
enfranchisement and the size and composition of government spending (Abrams and Settle,
1999; Aidt et al, 2006; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Stutzer and Kienast, 2005). In this note, we
switch attention to the impact of female enfranchisement on government budget balances
and take - as a rst step - a theoretical approach. Using a median voter model, we show
that if women have dierent economic preferences than men - for example in their rate of
time preference or in their degree of prudence toward risk - then female enfranchisement
leads to a change in the public savings rate or, equivalently, a dierent budget decit.
2 The model
When citizens are fully or partially credit constrained, the government budget decit can be
viewed as an indirect means of borrowing on behalf of the citizens. This means that citizens
will want to run decits for the same reasons that a credit-unconstrained citizen would
want to borrow to smooth their consumption over time. In turn, these motives depend
on individual preferences. We incorporate this view of the government budget decit in
a simple median voter model. To have an eect on economic outcomes of extending the
right to vote to women, we have to move away from the standard assumption of a unitary
household as the unit of optimization, and assume that men and women optimize their
respective utility under their respective constraints separately. Allowing preferences and
hence utility to dier systematically across men and women then leads to gender specic
dierences in the preferred level of the government budget decit, and in turn, to a dierent
realized budget decit as women are extended the right to vote.
The basic structure of the model is a two period model of the government budget,
in which the rst period budget balance is determined by the median voter through an
2election. The total population consists of n citizens, of which half is male and half is female.
All citizens have the same xed per period income which, without loss of generality, can be
normalized to zero.1 Moreover, each citizen receives an equal amount of net government
transfers in each of the two periods, gt;t = 1;2, where the net transfer is dened as
transfers received from government less taxes paid.2 The assumption that all citizens
receive the same transfer clearly does not reect reality very well, but is a simplication
which underscores our results, and also allows us to abstract from decits arising due to
common pool problems.3
Assume for simplicity that citizens are fully credit constrained (a partial credit con-
straint would do, but a full credit constraint simplies the model signicantly). The citizens
derive utility from total consumption, which under the credit constraint and the normal-
ization of private income to zero becomes equal to the net transfer. Thus, citizen i's utility
is given by the utility function:
U
i = ui (g1) + iui (g2); (1)
where ui is the felicity utility function and i = 1
1+i is the time discount factor for
citizen i. Assume further that:
u
0
i () > 0; u
00
i () < 0; and lim
g! 1u
0
i () = 1 for all i: (2)
To keep to the basic assumptions of the median voter model, assume that citizens
dier along one dimension only. In terms of the model, this dimension could for example be
1Allowing income to dier across men and women would complicate the derivations, but would not
change the basic conclusions which are only driven by the dierences in preferences assumed below. Even
if we allow for the combination of progressive income taxation and a lower average income level of women,
this would only aect the demand for public goods, but not the desired intertemporal nancing prole,
and hence, not the decit. As we abstract from levels of spending and taxes here, we do not pursue this
issue further.
2This way of expressing net transfers was rst proposed by Velasco (1999). Transfers from government
can be seen as including both social transfers and public goods, as public and private goods are assumed
to be perfect substitutes.
3See Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006) for a similar basic setup in which transfers can dier across groups,
leading to common pool problems and a decit bias.
3citizens' time preference, i, or the degree to which citizens are prudent and want to save for
precautionary reasons, u000
i . We make the example of gender dierences in time preference
here. Assume that the time discount factor derives from one of two distributions, namely
that of men and that of women. The i;h is the subjective discount factor of individual i








where e w and e m are the relative weights given to the future by the individual who
cares most about the future within each of the two groups. Assume that on average women
care more about the future than men:
e w > e m (4)
Assumption (3) on the distribution of the subjective time discount factors may seem
ad hoc, but the particular shape of the distribution is of no consequence for the results,
as long as the median woman cares more about the future than the median man.4 The
government's only role in this model is to set net transfers to its citizens by implementing
the budget decit policy announced prior to election (more on the election below). In
doing so, it is allowed to borrow or lend at the relevant interest rate as a means of nancing
potential decits/surpluses. The government is assumed to fully respect the intertemporal
budget constraint, and there is therefore no issue of debt default in the model. Let b denote
the government budget decit in period one, such that b = ng1. The intertemporal budget
constraint thus becomes:
ng1 + Rng2 = 0 (5)
where R = 1
1+r. We assume that the economy is small and open, and hence, that the
interest rate is xed at the world level. Maximizing (1) with respect to rst and second
4Browning (2000) makes a similar core assumption on gender specic preferences in a model of intra-
household savings decisions.
4period net transfers, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (5), yields the two rst




















where asterisks denote preferred policies, and g
1 hence denotes the preferred net transfer
in period one of citizen i. Note that (6) implies that the optimal transfer depends negatively
on the relative weight that the citizen places on future consumption, i.
We now turn to the elections. Let two parties, which each derive utility solely from
being in oce, compete for government at the beginning of period one. The party which
wins takes oce immediately, at the beginning of period one, and stays in oce till the end
of period two. The two parties campaign by announcing a scal policy to be implemented
if they win the election. Since their only objective is to be elected for oce, they will both
announce the policy which maximizes their respective number of votes. Citizen i will vote
for the party with the announced decit policy that attains her highest utility level. As is
standard in median voter models, both parties end up announcing the preferred policy of
the median voter, which hence will be the winning policy.5 All we have to do to know the
implemented scal policy is therefore to derive the preferred policy of the median voter.
The identity of the median voter depends on who has the right to vote. Assume rst







where bars denote values for the median voter. Following from (3) and (6), the median
man's preferred budget decit, b

m;1, is implicitly dened by:
5For the standard median voter argument, see Hotelling's (1929) spatial voting model, and Metzler






















Now extend the right to vote to women. Adding the distributions of the two groups
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e w+e m > 1
2. The time preference parameter of the median voter of the total
population (i.e. the n
2th citizen), now becomes
p = e m (9)
where the p subscript denotes values for the median voter of the entire population. The
associated preferred budget decit policy of the median voter when women are included in




















Since  > 1






The median voter has a lower preferred budget decit when women are included in the
electorate under assumption (4).
3 Conclusion
Women are gaining increasing political and economic inuence in some societies around
the world. If women have dierent economic preferences than men, might this increased
6inuence lead to changes in economic outcomes? The analysis in this short note implies
that the answer - at least theoretically - is yes. Within a relatively simple median voter
setup, and simple assumptions regarding dierences between male and female preferences,
we have shown that adding women to the electorate may change scal outcomes. In
particular, if women are more prudent toward risk than men, or if women discount time
less than men, then female enfranchisement leads to smaller budget decits, all else equal.
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